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COMMENT
BUCKING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: THE
MONTANA PUBLIC DEFENDER ACT
JESSA DESIMONE*
Since Gideon v. Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court has held that
indigent defendants have a constitutional right to legal representation in
state felony prosecutions. Forty years after Gideon, many indigent defense
systems are in a state of crisis. Therefore, this Comment will examine one
state's complete overhaul of its indigent defense system from a disparate,
locally controlled system to a statewide system based on nationally
recognized standards of indigent defense. By examining the factors that led
the Montana legislature to pass a Public Defender Act, this Comment will
shed light on ways activists concerned with indigent defense should use
their limited resources. It will show that while litigation alone is not
enough to bring transformative change, litigation can be the catalyst for
change.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Gideon v. Wainwright held that indigent defendants have a constitutional
right to legal representation in state felony prosecutions.' In 1972, the
Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin extended this right to any criminal trial-
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony.2 In 2005, the Supreme
Court continued to uphold Gideon's "right to counsel revolution" in
Halbert v. Michigan.3 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, stated
"[t]he Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses require the appointment of
* I would like to thank the JCLC staff and my husband, Rob Wilcox.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
125 S. Ct. 2582 (2005).
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counsel for defendants, convicted on their pleas, who seek access to first-
tier review in the Michigan Court of Appeals.",
4
While, forty years after Gideon, the basic right to counsel is firmly
entrenched, the word commonly used to describe indigent public defense
systems is "crisis." '5 For example, the American Bar Association (ABA)
has described the system as in a "state of crisis," "a system that lacks
fundamental fairness," and "shamefully inadequate."6
While the problems of indigent public defense systems frequently
appear as the topic of law review comments and symposia,7 what appears
less frequently is an analysis of the litigation and legislative victories that
have improved state public defense systems and the factors that led to these
improvements. Therefore, this Comment will examine a recent victory in
Montana-a complete overhaul of its indigent public defense system from a
disparate, locally controlled system to a statewide system based or.
nationally recognized standards for indigent defense systems, such as parity
in resources and funding between the state prosecutors and public
defenders. In fact, Montana's system is the first state system of indigent
defense that meets national standards for delivering high-quality
representation. 9
Section II of this Comment gives an overview of the right to counsel
for indigent defendants and common structures of indigent defense
systems.' 0 It then describes the current crisis in indigent defense systems
and examines national standards and studies that describe effective indigent
defense systems.'1 Section III examines past attempts at bringing change to
indigent defense systems through various state courts. 12  These changes
have not been particularly successful; therefore, in Section IV, this
Comment examines a recent successful transformation of a state indigent
4 Id. at 2586.
5 AM. BAR Ass'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S
BROKEN PROMISE (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE].
6Id.
7 See, e.g., Symposium, Gideon Introduction: Debate: Gideon at 40: Facing the Crisis,
Fulfilling the Promise, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 131 (2004) ("[A] major focus of the
Symposium was on the existing deficiencies in the indigent defense process.").
8 See AM. BAR Ass'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA
TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM (2002) [hereinafter ABA TEN
PRINCIPLES].
9 Leonard Post, Montana Upgrades Indigency Defense System, 27 NAT'L L.J. P4 (June 6,
2005); see also Mike Dennison, Public Defender System Cited as National Model, GREAT
FALLS TRIB. (Mont.), June 8, 2005, at Al.
10 See infra Section II.A.
11 See infra Sections ILB-D.
12 See infra Section III.
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defense system through the legislature, instead of through the courts. 3
While conventional wisdom says that trying to change indigent public
defense systems through the legislature is political suicide, 4 the Montana
Legislature passed a transformative bill without a mandate from a court, but
with a push from litigators, hopefully ensuring that the political will
required to fund and maintain this new public defense system is sustained.
By-examining the factors that led the Montana Legislature to pass this bill,
this Comment will clarify how activists concerned with indigent defense
should focus their limited resources, and it will show that while litigation
alone is not enough to bring transformative change, it can be the catalyst for
change.
II. BACKGROUND
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense."' 5 Until the 1960s, the Supreme
Court construed this amendment to mean that in federal courts, counsel
must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless they
waive that right. 16 In 1963, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right
to the assistance of counsel was "fundamental and essential to a fair trial"
and was also binding upon the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.'
7
13 See infra Section TV.
14 Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent
Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1731 (2005) [hereinafter Effectively Ineffective]; see
also DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE 92 (1999) ("Providing genuinely adequate counsel for
poor defendants would require a substantial infusion of money, and indigent defense is the
last thing the populace will voluntarily direct its tax dollars to fund. Achieving solutions to
this problem through the political process is a pipedream."); Adele Bernhard, Take Courage:
What the Courts Can Do to Improve the Delivery of Criminal Defense Services, 63 U. PITT.
L. REV. 293, 294 (2002) ("[F]ederal and state legislatures have largely ignored wide-spread
and acute deficiencies in the programs that ensure representation for the vast majority of
individuals accused of crime,...."); Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Just: The
Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor when Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 787 (1997) ("[M]ost state and local governments have been more
concerned with keeping costs low than with providing quality defense services or with
ensuring fair trials. When they have examined factors other than costs, many evaluate
indigent defense programs not from the standpoint of ensuring fair trials, but with an eye to
increasing administrative convenience in moving dockets and securing convictions.").
'5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (explaining Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938)).
'7 Id. at 342.
2006] 1481
JESSA DESIMONE
Thus, post-Gideon, states were required to use their own resources to
provide counsel for indigent defendants in felony criminal proceedings.'
8
Gideon, however, was just the beginning of the Court's attempt to
define the scope and meaning of this Sixth Amendment right as applied to
the states. In the past four decades, the Supreme Court has determined that
states must appoint counsel in state juvenile delinquency proceedings,' 9 in
any criminal proceeding in which the defendant faces the loss of liberty
upon conviction, 0 and in a first appeal as of right. 21 However, the state
need not appoint counsel in discretionary appeals to the state's highest court
22or to the U.S. Supreme Court. In addition, the right to counsel attaches at
critical stages that occur before trial, such as custodial interrogations,
23
post-indictment lineups, 24 and preliminary hearings.25 Thus, the Supreme
Court has expanded the rights of indigent defendants in a variety of
contexts.
A. COMMON STRUCTURES OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS
Since Gideon and its progeny did not specify a particular model for
organizing or funding indigent defense systems, "each state has defined the
right to counsel through its own respective constitutional provisions,
judicial opinions, and legislation. 26 The three most common systems of
organization are: (1) the public defender model, in which salaried attorneys
provide representation on indigent cases; (2) the assigned counsel model, in
18 Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon's Promise: Lessons from England and the Need
for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 843 (2004) ("[Gideon] constitute[d] an enormous
unfunded mandate imposed upon the states.").
19 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
20 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654
(2002) (ruling that a "suspended" sentence with probation cannot be imposed unless the
defendant was represented by counsel). But see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)
(holding that the state is not required to appoint counsel in a trial court where imprisonment
for the offense was authorized but not actually imposed).
21 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); see also Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258
(1967) (deciding that a transcript and motion by trial counsel are not adequate substitution
for an appellate lawyer's review of the record and legal research).
22 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
23 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (articulating the Miranda right to counsel
that arises from the Fifth Amendment).
24 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967).
25 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
26 Cait Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders in the Community: Expanding the Conceptual




which the court assigns indigent cases to private attorneys who are
compensated on a case-by-case basis; and (3) the contract model, in which
there is a private bar contract with an attorney or a group of attorneys that
will provide representation in some or all of the indigent defense cases in
the jurisdiction.27 Many states employ a combination of these three
approaches. 28 Systems may be organized at the state, county, region, or
judicial district level,29 and funding can come from a combination of state
funds, county funds, user fees, and court costs.3°
B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
While the Supreme Court has not specified exactly what type of
indigent defense systems states must provide, it has ruled that the right to
counsel requires "effective assistance of competent counsel., 31 The seminal
case on this issue, Strickland v. Washington,32 established a two-prong test
to determine when there has been ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) the
defendant must prove that her counsel's performance was deficient; i.e., the
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) this
deficient performance must prejudice the defendant so as to deprive her of a
fair trial; i.e., there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.33 It seems that Strickland should be a tool to ensure that a state's
indigent defense system is "effective." In practice, however, courts have
seldom utilized the Strickland doctrine to overturn cases based on
incompetent counsel.34 In particular, many courts have been hesitant to
apply the ineffective assistance of counsel standards to public defenders
assisting indigent defendants. For example, courts have not used Strickland
even when public defenders were unaware of current governing law, were
27 Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United
States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 32 (1995). "The National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, which represents some 10,000 criminal lawyers, has condemned the use
of fixed-price contracts. It says they're designed 'to process the maximum number of
defendants at the lowest cost, without regard to truth, justice or innocence."' Alan Berlow,
Requiem for a Public Defender, AM. PROSPECT, June 5, 2000.
28 Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 27, at 32.
29 Id. at 37.
3 Id. at 41.
31 See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
32 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
31 Id. at 687.
34 Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1751, 1786-87 (1999) (book review)
("The simple restatement of the Strickland standard, as it has emerged in practice, is that a
lawyer with a pulse will be deemed effective.").
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intoxicated at the trial, or slept through the trial.35 Moreover, as one author
noted, "the Strickland standard is applied individually and
retrospectively. 36  Thus, it is difficult to challenge whole systems of
indigent defense that "seem repulsive under Gideon [but] may not amount
to Strickland ineffectiveness. 37 Indigent defense systems do not fail under
Strickland, even when they are so short on funding that public defenders
carry "caseloads that make it difficult, if not impossible, to provide
effective representation. ' 38 Thus, federal courts have so far been unwilling
to provide recourse to inadequate funding of indigent defense systems.
39
C. CRISIS IN STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS
The current state of crisis in indigent defense systems has been
acknowledged by everyone from academics,
4 ° practitioners, 4 1 journalists, 42
and advocacy organizations 43 to the ABA .44 The ABA, for example, held a
series of public hearings in 2003 and then commissioned a report on the
broken promise of Gideon.45 Summarizing the testimony of the expert
witnesses at the public hearings, this report concluded:
35 Bright, supra note 14, at 783; see id. at 785-86 & nn.7-9.
36 Nicole J. De Sario, The Quality of Indigent Defense on the 40th Anniversary of
Gideon: The Hamilton County Experience, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 43, 47 (2003).
37 Id.; see also Bernhard, supra note 14, at 304 n.69; William S. Geimer, A Decade of
Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (1995).
38 Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 27, at 37.
39 This is especially true in light of the federal abstention doctrines. See Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that federal courts should not interfere with the
operation of state and local criminal prosecutions); Bernhard, supra note 14, at 332 ("Federal
courts have been prevented largely from engaging in the reform of state indigent defense
systems by abstention doctrine."); id. at 332 n.237 (citing Gardner v. Luckey, 500 F.2d 712
(5th Cir. 1974) (denying relief for a claim that the Florida public defender systematically
failed to meet minimum constitutional standards in the representation afforded to indigents
because the federal abstention doctrine prevented the federal court from intervening in state
judicial processes)).
40 Lefstein, supra note 18.
4 1 THE NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, AN ASSESSMENT OF INDIGENT DEFENSE
SERVICES IN MONTANA (2004) [hereinafter NLADA ASSESSMENT].
42 Anthony Lewis, The Silencing of Gideon's Trumpet, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 2003, at
50.
43 Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Argues in Supreme Court that the Poor Have a Right to
Counsel (Oct. 4, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/scotus/2004/13959prs2004
1004.html.




[C]urrent indigent defense systems often operate at substandard levels and provide
woefully inadequate representation .... Witnesses described programs bereft of the
funding and resources necessary to afford even the most basic tools essential for an
effective defense. As a result, literally thousands of accused poor persons who are
unable to afford counsel are denied, either entirely or in part, meaningful legal
representation.
46
The ABA divided the problems of most indigent defense systems into
three distinct parts: lack of adequate funding, inadequate legal
representation, and structural defects in indigent defense systems.4 7
Inadequate funding is most frequently cited as one of the major problems of
indigent defense systems,48 and that lack of funding is the greatest factor
adversely affecting quality of representation. 49 During the ABA's public
hearings, witnesses representing twenty-two states reported "grave
inadequacies" in the available resources for indigent defense. 50 This lack of
funding precipitated inadequate attorney compensation51 and a lack of
essential resources such as expert, investigative, and support services, 52 and
often led to a sizable resource disparity between the prosecution and the
defense.53
Problems with inadequate legal representation include the fact that
client/lawyer interactions often begin minutes before the trial and end
moments later when the defense attorney tells the client what plea deal has
been negotiated,54 and the attorney's lack of investigation, research, and
zealous advocacy.55 Structural defects in indigent defense systems include
lack of attorney independence, 6 excessive caseloads,57  absence of
oversight to ensure uniform quality services,58 and failure to provide
counsel beyond the minimum required by the Supreme Court. 59 The U.S.
46 Id. at 7.
41 Id. at 7, 14, 20.
48 Bernhard, supra note 14, at 308 (noting that lack of funding is such a problem with
indigent defense that several academics claim that "no matter how effective the structure,
inadequate funding adversely affects all defense systems"). For further materials on
inadequate funding, see Lefstein, supra note 18, at 846 n.53.
49 Bernhard, supra note 14, at 309.
50 GIDEON's BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 8.
5' Id. at 9.
52 Id. at 10.
53 Id. at 13.
4 Id. at 16.
s Id. at 19.
56 Id. at 20.
51 Id. at 17.
51 Id. at 21.
59 Id. at 22.
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Department of Justice commissioned a report in 2000 which highlighted
several similar problems in state indigent defense systems. 60 The problems
found included a lack of adequate resources, insufficient attorney
compensation, excessive caseloads for public defenders, and lack of
attorney independence.
61
Moreover, studies have found that inadequate legal representation is a
major contributing factor to wrongful convictions. 6' The final report of the
2000 National Symposium on Indigent Defense sponsored by the U.S.
Department of Justice, stated: "There are many ways that innocent people
may be drawn into the criminal justice system .... But there is one
overarching way that innocent indigent people can be extricated from the
system: by furnishing competent legal representation. 63  Thus, both the
private bar and the federal government have found many problems within
existing indigent defense systems.
While there has been a tendency to dwell on the crisis in indigent
defense systems, there has also been a recent wave of standards and
structural ideas put forth on what constitutes an effective indigent defense
system. 64
D. DEFINING AN EFFECTIVE INDIGENT PUBLIC DEFENSE SYSTEM
Research has demonstrated two primary factors that determine the
quality of indigent defense services: (1) the sufficiency of funding; and (2)
compliance with nationally recognized standards for the delivery of
indigent defense services.65 The necessity of adequate funding of indigent
60 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT
DEF. 2000: REDEFINING LEADERSHIP FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2000) [hereinafter OFFICE OF
JUSTICE PROGRAMS].
61 Id. at 3-5.
62 Lefstein, supra note 18, at 860 n.135; see also Bernhard, supra note 14, at 294 n.3.
63 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, supra note 60, at 75; see also Innocence Project: Poor
Defense Lawyering, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/badlawyering.php
("[Ilneffective or incompetent defense counsel have allowed men and women who might
otherwise have been proven innocent at trial to be sent to prison.... The shrinking funding
and access to resources for public defenders and court appointed attorneys is only
exacerbating the problem.").
64 See ABA TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 8; INST. FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF
STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS (Neal Miller ed., 2000) (describing national,
state, and local standards relating to five functions of indigent defense); THE NAT'L LEGAL
AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE
REPRESENTATION (1995).
65 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (holding that national standards should stand
as guideposts in assessing ineffective assistance of counsel claims); NLADA ASSESSMENT,
supra note 41, at 4, 7 (concluding that standards-based assessments have become the
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defense systems is obvious. States that adequately finance the entire
indigent defense system tend to have better indigent defense systems than
ones dependent on local county financing.66
Because local funding is primarily derived from property taxes, the amount available
for defender services tends to constrict in inverse proportion to the demand for such
services (i.e., a weakened local economy causes increases in unemployment, worker
flight, demands for other county services, and crime). As a result, the quality of
public defender representation in a state that relies upon local funding generally
fluctuates widely from locality to locality. A system that metes out justice in
proportion to the availability of limited local resources cannot assure victims, the
accused, and the general public that resulting verdicts are fair .... 67
Adequate state funding alone, however, cannot guarantee a quality
defense system.6 8  Right to counsel "requires the promulgation and
enforcement of standards for attorney competency. '' 69  In addition, the
combination of the lack of adequate funding and the lack of standards
results in sub-par representation, as measured by failure to adequately
investigate charges, communicate regularly with clients, hire experts,
maintain current legal knowledge, and preserve viable issues for appeal.7 °
The ABA established the most widely accepted and used set of
national standards for indigent defense.7 1  The ABA claims that these
principles "constitute the fundamental criteria necessary to design a system
that provides effective, efficient, high quality, ethical, conflict-free legal
representation for criminal defendants who are unable to afford an
attorney. 72 The ABA's principles focus on public defender independence,
manageable caseloads, adequate time spent with clients, defender training,
education, supervision, and parity with the state prosecutors.7 3
recognized norm for guaranteeing the adequacy of criminal defense services provided to the
poor).
66 NAT'L ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUC.
FUND, INC., ECONOMIC LOSSES AND THE PUBLIC SYSTEM OF INDIGENT DEFENSE: EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE ON PRE-SENTENCING BEHAVIOR FROM MISSISSIPPI (2003); NLADA ASSESSMENT,
supra note 41, at 4.
67 NLADA ASSESSMENT, supra note 41, at 4.
68 Id. (citing independent reports from seventeen states to point out that "assessments
from around the country demonstrate that those states that adopt and enforce
standards ... and provide adequate statewide funding" are the best at providing a meaningful
right to counsel).
69 Id.; see also Bernhard, supra note 14 (discussing the importance of standards).
70 NLADA ASSESSMENT, supra note 41, at 5.
71 Id. at 7; see also ABA TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 8. These principles were sponsored
by the ABA Standing Committee on Legal and Indigent Defendants and were approved by
the ABA House of Delegates in February 2002. Id. at Introduction.
72 ABA TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at Introduction.
73 Id. The ten principles are: (1) the public defense function is independent; (2) the
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Unfortunately, effective indigent defense systems are rare, especially
in predominately rural states. Thus, while it is important to conduct
research and formulate standards that describe effective systems, it is just as
necessary to examine successful strategies to accomplish these goals.
III. ATTEMPTS TO BRING JUDICIALLY MANDATED CHANGE
In the face of this acknowledged crisis, it is important to examine
different strategies on how to effect substantive change to indigent defense
systems. The conventional wisdom on strategies for bringing change to
indigent defense systems is that because of the political unpopularity of
criminal defendants, coupled with indigent defendants' lack of financial and
political capital, state legislatures are unlikely to allocate significant
attention or resources to the problem of indigent defense.74 Thus, some
scholars claim that state court litigation75 and judicial activism are the
proper avenues for those who want to bring about structural change.76 State
litigation, however, is a narrow, limited solution because of traditional
notions of separation of powers and problems with judicial enforcement.77
A. STATE LAWSUITS
In response to the above mentioned problems with indigent defense
systems, several scholars have argued that systemic Sixth Amendment
litigation addressing a jurisdiction's mechanism for providing indigent
criminal defense will be the most successful strategy in precipitating
change.78 Systemic litigation, however, is extremely difficult. 79 Even if a
public defense consists of a defender office and the active participation of the private bar if
the caseload is "sufficiently high"; (3) the defense counsel is assigned and notified "as soon
as feasible" after clients' arrest, detention, or request for counsel; (4) the defense counsel is
provided sufficient time and a confidential space within which to meet the client; (5) the
defense counsel's workload is controlled to permit the rendering of quality representation;
(6) the defense counsel's ability, training, and experience match the complexity of the case;
(7) the same attorney represents the client until the completion of the case; (8) a parity in
resources between the defense counsel and the prosecution; (9) the defense counsel is
provided with and required to attend continuing legal education; and (10) the defense
counsel is supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and efficiency. Id.
74 See supra note 14 for discussion of conventional wisdom.
75 Federal suits are typically not an option because of the abstention doctrine. See
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Bernhard, supra note 14, at 332 ("Federal courts
have been prevented from engaging in the reform of state indigent defense systems by
abstention doctrine.").
76 Bernhard, supra note 14, at 346.
77 See infra Section III.a.
78 See Bernhard, supra note 14, at 322 n.173; Margaret H. Lemos, Civil Challenges to
the Use of Low-Bid Contracts for Indigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1808 (2000); Richard
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case is brought and adjudicated on the merits, there are two major
difficulties. First, structural limitations inherent in state courts-such as
jurisdictional issues, separation of power notions, 8I and the related
concern of a judiciary that lacks democratic authority and institutional
capacity to "spend funds, create government entities, and craft enforceable
rules" 82---often lead to narrow remedies or remedies that are difficult to
enforce. Second, even if a case challenging the entire indigent defense
system could be brought and won, courts, especially those handing down
big structural changes, may face a major problem with enforcement.83
These problems are exemplified in the three state cases typically regarded
as ones that brought "far-reaching" reforms:8 4 State v. Peart,85 State v.
Smith,86 and State v. Lynch.87
J. Wilson, Litigative Approaches to Enforcing the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 203, 216-17 (1986); Effectively
Ineffective, supra note 14, at 2062. See generally Robert A. Schapiro, The Legislative
Injunction: A Remedy for Unconstitutional Legislative Inaction, 99 YALE L.J. 231 (1989)
(arguing that courts should be able to create "legislation" in the school desegregation
context).
79 Bernhard, supra note 14, at 322 (successful litigation requires "egregious
conditions... allegations of actual injury to clients, litigation support from a law reform
organization or bar organization, and public favor"); see also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE 334 (1990) ("The Court... was
unable to achieve its goals [of providing effective indigent defense counsel] because political
support was often lacking .... ).
80 If an indigent defense system is funded and structured by the county then any remedies
brought from a successful suit will only apply to the county. See State v. Smith, 681 P.2d
1374 (Ariz. 1984).
81 State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 791 (La. 1993) ("We decline at this time to undertake
these more intrusive and specific measures because this Court should not lightly tread in the
affairs of other branches of government and because the legislature ought to assess such
measures in the first instance.").
82 Miller, supra note 34, at 1807.
83 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at 483 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1888) (The judiciary "has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either
of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It
may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment .. ");
ROSENBERG, supra note 79, at 18-19 ("A further obstacle for court effectiveness.., is that
significant social reform often requires large expenditures. Judges, in general prohibited
from actively politicking and cutting deals, are not in a particularly powerful position to
successfully order the other branches to expend additional funds. 'The real problem' in
cases of reform, Judge Bazelon wrote, 'is one of inadequate resources, which the courts are
helpless to remedy.' . . . [C]ourts 'ultimately lack the power to force state governments to
act."') (citations omitted).
84 De Sario, supra note 36, at 60; Effectively Ineffective, supra note 14, at 1735.
8 621 So. 2d 780.
86 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984).
87 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990).
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1. State v. Peart
State v. Peart is a case on appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court from
a trial judge's ruling that Louisiana's "system for securing and
compensating qualified counsel as a whole [is] unconstitutional as applied
in the City of New Orleans., 88 An Orleans Indigent Defender Program
attorney represented a defendant charged with armed robbery, aggravated
rape, aggravated burglary, attempted armed robbery, and first-degree
murder. 89 During the trial, counsel for the defendant made a "Motion for
Relief to Provide Constitutionally Mandated Protection and Resources."9
In response to this motion, the trial court held a series of hearings on the
defense services provided to Peart and other defendants in Section E of the
criminal district court.
91
After the hearings, the trial court held that the indigent defense system
in New Orleans was unconstitutional.92 On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana partially agreed and held that the services being provided to
indigent defendants in one particular section of the Orleans Parish Criminal
Court "do not in all cases meet constitutionally mandated standards for
effective assistance of counsel. 93  The remedy provided by the court,
however, did not require great expenditure of funds by the legislature or the
creation of a different statutory or funding scheme, even for the one
particular section, Section E, of the local criminal justice system (Orleans
Parish).94 Instead, the court remanded the case with instructions for the trial
court to apply a "rebuttable presumption that indigents are not receiving
assistance of counsel sufficiently effective to meet constitutionally required
standards., 95 However, subsequent ineffective assistance of counsel cases
brought in Louisiana demonstrate that Peart has been an unsuccessful
mechanism for criminal defendants to obtain relief.96 For instance, in State
v. Hughes and State v. Jeff, cases brought when there were no funds
available to pay the court-appointed attorney, courts did not find that there
88 Peart, 621 So. 2d at 783.




93 Id. at 783.
94 id.
95 Id. (discussing indigent defense services in New Orleans operated under a public
defender model).
96 See Effectively Ineffective, supra note 14.
[Vol. 961490
BUCKING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
was ineffective assistance of counsel on the record, even with the Peart
presumption applied.97
2. State v. Smith
In Smith, a defendant was found guilty of burglary and sexual
assault.98 The Arizona Supreme Court granted review to consider if Smith
received adequate assistance of counsel at trial. 99 In determining if Smith
received adequate assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court of Arizona
examined how one Arizona county selected attorneys for its contract system
of indigent defense. 00 Smith's attorney, as part of the contract system of
providing indigent defense, handled on a part-time basis 149 felonies, 160
misdemeanors, 21 juvenile cases, and 33 other cases in the first eleven
months of the year that Smith's case went to trial.'O° The court agreed with
Smith that this caseload was "excessive, if not crushing."'' 0 2 The court held
that since the funding and appointment system did not take into account the
time and costs spent by the attorney and the competency of the attorney in
respect to the complexity of the case, it did not meet the requirements of
guidelines proposed by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association
(NLADA). Therefore, there would be an inference in each future case that
this system results in ineffective assistance of counsel. 0 3 While the court's
decision did establish guidelines that the state must follow to maintain its
97 Id. at 1737 (citing State v. Hughes, 653 So. 2d 748 (La. Ct. App. 1995), and State v.
Jeff, 761 So. 2d 574 (La. Ct. App. 1999), as examples of cases where the court did not find
that there was ineffective assistance of counsel on the record, even with the Peart
presumption). After Hurricane Katrina, the entire criminal justice system of Orleans Parish
is the focus of intense scrutiny, particularly the indigent public defense system. See Press
Release, ACLU, National Prison Project Calls for Immediate Action by President, Congress
and Justice Department (Aug. 10, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/prison/conditions/
26421prs20060810.html. It will be interesting and important to examine how the parish
rebuilds its defender system.
98 State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Ariz. 1984).
99 Id.
0 Id. at 1376, 1379. The procedure for providing indigent defense counsel is that each
year the presiding judge of Mohave County sends out a letter to all attorneys in the county
requesting bids to be assigned to all indigent criminal cases in the superior court, justice of
the peace courts, juvenile courts, and all appeals and mental evaluations. Id. at 1379. After
the judge receives the bids, the judge sends the bids with a cover letter summarizing the
dollar sums bid to the County Board of Supervisors. Id. With only one exception in the four
years prior to this case, the Board accepted the lowest bid offered. Id.
'0' Id. at 1380.
102 Id.




contract system, such systems were relatively rare in Arizona. 10 4 Thus, this
holding had little practical effect, since it only applied to one county and
only to the few indigent defendants represented through the contract
system. 1
05
3. State v. Lynch
In State v. Lynch, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma examined whether
the trial court erred in declaring an Oklahoma statute that governed the
court appointment of counsel unconstitutional as applied, since appointed
counsel were forced to represent indigent defendants without the assurance
of receiving adequate, speedy, and certain compensation. °6  This case
began when the Oklahoma District Court appointed two attorneys to
represent an indigent defendant charged with first degree murder.
107
Following the defendant's sentencing, the attorneys petitioned the court for
fees and expenses of $17,073.03 and $10,995.00, respectively.' 08 However,
Oklahoma passed a statute which placed a $3,200 restriction on indigent
defender attorney fees.' 09 In response, the attorneys filed suit claiming that
the statute was unconstitutional in that it violated their due process rights by
forcing them to represent indigent defendants without the assurance of
receiving adequate compensation. 01 The court held that the statute was
unconstitutional in application and handed down a remedy in regards to
indigent defense funding: it established an interim set of guidelines for
funding; adopted a principle of parity between indigent defense attorneys
and prosecutors; and required reimbursement for defense counsel's
overhead and out-of-pocket expenses."l' While Lynch was a good initial
104 Miller, supra note 34, at 1795 n.213.
'o' Id. at 1795 n.214 (citing Larry A. Hammond & John A. Stookey, New Rules on
Indigent Representation: A Step in the Right Direction or an Invitation that an Ethical
Attorney Should Reject, ARIz. ATT'Y, Feb. 1997, at 21; Michael L. Piccarreta, The Promise
of Gideon, ARIz. ATT'Y, Mar. 1997, at 10; John A. Stookey & Larry A. Hammond,
Rethinking Arizona's System of Indigent Representation, ARIZ. ATT'Y, Oct. 1996, at 28).
Also, the holding in this case may have spurred the legislature to increase funding; however,
by 1992 the system "was again under a tremendous strain." Effectively Ineffective, supra
note 14, at 1741 (citing Dean Trebesch, New Challenges in Indigent Defense, ARIz. ATr'Y,
Nov. 1992, at 25-26).
106 State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Okla. 1990).
107 Id. at 1153.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1154.
"' Id. at 1156. It is striking that Lynch, the case that has the most far-reaching overturns,
is the case in which the court held that "the constitutional right of the indigent is not at
issue-the due process rights of appointed counsel are." Id.
"' Id. at 1161-62.
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step, its remedy is limited in regards to its ability to precipitate
transformative change, as the court could have demanded a higher level of
funding for appointed counsel or taken measures to establish a statewide
public defender system. 1 2 Lynch also exemplifies courts' problems with
enforcement: this opinion did spur the legislature into action, to create the
Oklahoma Indigent Defense System. However, since this remedy did not
stem from the political will of the legislature, the legislature continuously
failed to provide sufficient funding for the program. 113
These three cases demonstrate that courts typically hand down very
narrow holdings, and if litigants actually succeed in compelling the
legislature to act with short-term additional funding, the courts are unable to
enforce funding in the long-term."l 4 This conclusion is demonstrated by the
fact that the Supreme Court of Louisiana did not apply the Peart
presumption in State v. Hughes and State v. Jeff,',"5 by the fact that in
Arizona by 1992, the indigent defense system "was again under tremendous
strain"; 1 6 and, by the fact that in Oklahoma, the public defender system
faced repeated financial crisis.
117
Moreover, other state courts have been reluctant to follow even these
"cautious first steps" toward judicial reform of the defense system, 118 and
the few that have tried have had mixed results. In 2000, the New York
County Lawyers' Association successfully sued the state to raise the rates
paid to appointed counsel." 9 For almost two decades, their pay rates had
not increased from between $25 and $40 an hour.120 This pay rate was the
112 Miller, supra note 34, at 1799 ("[The court] might have evaluated the resources for
prosecution and defense and demanded a higher level of funding for appointed
counsel.... The court might have gone well beyond parity and established a new statewide
public defender system, or at least taken measures consistent with such a step.").
113 Effectively Ineffective, supra note 14, at 1739 (citing BENJAMIN CURTIS ET AL., OKLA.
INDIGENT DEF. SYS., ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2002)). This report includes a list of many of the
other problems Oklahoma's indigent defense system has faced due to lack of legislative
action. Id.
114 Effectively Ineffective, supra note 14, at 1742.
115 See supra Section III.A.1.
116 Effectively Ineffective, supra note 14, at 1741.
117 Id. at 1739.
118 Miller, supra note 34, at 1753.
19 Press Release, N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, NYCLA Settles Lawsuit Against N.Y.
State and City Challenging Constitutionality of Compensation Rates for Assigned Counsel
(Nov. 12, 2003), available at http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications
1 16_0.pdf [hereinafter NYCLA Settlement Press Release].
120 Press Release, N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, New York County Lawyers'
Association Sues Pataki on Behalf of Children and Adults Who Cannot Afford Counsel
(Feb. 18, 2000), available at http://www.nycla.org/publications/I8blawsuit.htm.
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second-lowest paid by any state and fell far short of meeting the cost of
representation. 21 In 2002, an injunction was issued by the trial judge that
more than doubled the rates. 22 The state appealed, staying the raise. 123 In
2003 the legislature acted, setting the rates between $60 and $75 per hour-
more than 30% less than what the plaintiffs had sought. 124  Elsewhere,
plaintiffs in the Detroit area who sued for an increase in indigent defender
attorney fees lost outright in the Michigan Supreme Court in 2003.125 Thus,
state lawsuits are not by any means guaranteed to be successful. Moreover,
even when successful, state lawsuits do not appear to be the ideal manner of
bringing truly transformative change that applies to the entire state, or even
of enforcing the limited change that they have brought.' 26 However, as the
next section demonstrates, a complete overhaul of indigent public defense
systems is possible when the legislature, rather than the judiciary, acts.
IV. MONTANA
Recent legislative activity in Montana shows that change that comes
from the legislature, rather than the courts, is more likely to be
transformative. The questions, then, are twofold: how was it possible to
overcome the conventional wisdom 27 that legislatures do not act on fixing
indigent defense, and is there still a role for litigation? However, prior to
examining how and why change occurred in Montana, it is useful to
examine the crisis in Montana's system of indigent defense that precipitated
legislative action.
A. CRISIS IN MONTANA
Like many other states, Montana had problems with its indigent
defense system.1 28 Until 2003, Montana's structure of indigent defense was
121 Id.
122 NYCLA Settlement Press Release, supra note 119.
123 Id.
124 id.
125 Wayne County Crim. Def. Bar Ass'n v. Chief Judges of Wayne Circuit Court, 663
N.W.2d 471, 472 (Mich. 2003).
126 In addition, other courts have not followed the limited success of Peart, Smith, and
Lynch. See Miller, supra note 34, at 1801-03 (citing Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1
(Minn. 1996); Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1338 (Miss. 1990)).
127 See supra note 14 for discussion of conventional wisdom.
128 NLADA ASSESSMENT, supra note 41, at 58 ("Attorneys failed to conflict themselves
out of even the clearest cases of conflicts of interest, waived probable ca[u]se and
preliminary hearings with inordinate frequency, failed to meet regularly and meaningfully
with their clients, failed to investigate their clients' cases, made motions and went to trial
only rarely, prioritized speedy dispositions over the best interests of their clients, improperly
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a patchwork of county-employed public defenders, private attorneys who
worked on contract with counties, and private attorneys appointed by judges
for individual cases. 129 The NLADA characterized this system as:
[An] indigent defense [system] in Montana [of] a rugged individualism in which
attorneys go it alone, without the funding, resources, training, supervision and
oversight that other indigent defense providers and criminal defense attorneys
consider essential to the provision of constitutionally adequate legal
representation.... Montana delivers ineffective, inefficient, unethical, conflict-ridden,
representation to the poor.130
Montana delegated primary responsibility for the funding and
administration of its indigent defense systems to its counties.131 Counties
could choose to either establish a public defender office, a contract system,
an assigned counsel system, or a combination of systems. 132  Montana
reimbursed counties for the costs of providing defender services to adults
charged with felonies in the district courts. 13 3 However, reimbursement was
dependent on the availability of funding, and annual fluctuations in funding
resulted in a dearth of money with which counties could consistently pay
their public defense attorneys. 134  Counties had to self-finance indigent
defense services in juvenile delinquency proceedings and adult
misdemeanor proceedings in the justice and city courts. 35  State self-
financing resulted in low salaries for attorneys' representing indigent
defendants. 1
36
waived their clients' speedy trial rights, and seldom made appeals on behalf of their
clients.").
129 See Second Amended Complaint, White v. Martz, No. CDV-2002-133 at 3 (1st Jud.
Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Dec. 2003). For example, Butte-Silver Bow, Flathead, Lake and
Raavalli Counties contracted with local attorneys, Missoula County had a public defender
office, and Glacier and Teton Counties relied on the District Court Judge for the Ninth
Judicial District to assign counsel on a case-by-case basis. Id.
130 NLADA ASSESSMENT, supra note 41, at 13, 14.
' Id. at 11.
132 Id. Pursuant to the 1985 District Court Reimbursement Program, counties could seek
reimbursement for some of the costs associated with the delivery of indigent defense
services in the district courts from the State. Id.
133 Id.
134 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 129, at 26. "The State relied on the motor
vehicle licensing tax to fund [public defense attorneys] .... Because the amount of tax
collected varied from year to year, the State only guaranteed reimbursement to the extent
that funding was available." Id. In 2002, pursuant to Senate Bill 176, the funding structure
changed, but Montana "continued to refuse to guarantee full reimbursement." Id.




After legislation passed in July 2003,137 the state assumed funding for
all proceedings in state trial courts (except those incurred in jurisdictions in
which the county had created a public defender's office) while the counties
continued to finance indigent defense in state misdemeanor courts.' 38
Funding for indigent defense systems, however, remained inadequate. For
example, in fiscal year 2003, Montana set aside $6.15 million to reimburse
the counties for their indigent defense spending. 139 However, three months
prior to the end of the fiscal year, this money was drained, and the state had
nothing left to distribute to the counties. 140 Moreover, in 2004, the state
reduced its indigent defense funding to $5.4 million. 141 Not only was there
a dearth of funding, but, in response to the legislation, four counties
terminated or refused to renew their indigent defense contracts and declined
to exercise ongoing administrative or supervisory authority over the
delivery of indigent defense. 142
Montana also continued to have several structural problems in its
system of indigent defense. 143 There were no statewide written standards
that defined a counselor's obligation to her client or that outlined the
parameters of the defense function (except with respect to capital
representation). 144  Similarly, there were no statewide written procedures
regarding conflicts of interest, attorney/client contact, the use of
investigators and experts, the right to a speedy trial, plea bargaining, or
requests for continuances. 
145
Moreover, Montana had no statewide policies or procedures limiting
the number or type of indigent defense cases to which an attorney could be
assigned, and no uniform policies or procedures for collecting, maintaining,
or analyzing caseload data. 146 For example, Montana put no limits on the
number of private clients part-time public defenders could represent while
simultaneously accepting court appointments. 47  There were no formal
guidelines defining excessive workloads or procedures instructing attorneys
' S. 490, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2003).
138 NLADA ASSESSMENT, supra note 41, at 12.
139 Id. at 15.
140 Id. (citing Deposition of Supreme Court Administrator, R. James Oppedahl 47 (Mar.
25, 2004)).
141 LAW AND JUSTICE PUBLIC DEF. SUBCOMM., MINUTES (Apr. 30, 2004).
142 NLADA ASSESSMENT, supra note 41, at 12.
143 Id. at 13-14.
144 See Patricia Manson, Effective Counsel Not Assured, Panel Told, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Feb. 10, 2003, at 1.
145 NLADA ASSESSMENT, supra note 41, at 54.




with excessive workloads how to seek assistance or relief.148 In fact, many
attorneys stated that they were not permitted to decline cases, regardless of
how overwhelmed they were, unless they could demonstrate a conflict of
interest.
149
Montana also did not require that those responsible for administering
indigent defense programs hire providers on merit, train them in criminal
defense, issue written practice standards, and monitor and limit excessive
workloads.150  The majority of Montana counties had no orientation
program for newly hired indigent defense attorneys, no systematic and
comprehensive training, and no technical assistance.' 51 Attorneys who were
thought to be too vigorous in their defense of clients had been denied
appointments. 152 In addition, some defenders reported that judges pressured
them to pursue plea bargains, to handle their cases in a manner that was
convenient to the court, or to refrain from vigorously pursuing justifiable
defense strategies. 153
The lack of funding and structural problems exacerbated the disparity
between publicly-funded prosecutors and public defenders. For example,
Montana law mandated that the state Attorney General direct and supervise
all of the county prosecutors; however, there was no centralized public-
defender supervisor. 154 State law also required that prosecutors in large
counties work full-time, have at least five years of experience, and receive a
base salary, yet did not include any description of defender qualifications or
compensation. 55 In addition, state law provided for a County Attorney
Assistance Program, but did not provide any training or technical assistance
to public defenders. 56 In Missoula County, for instance, the prosecutor's
office had twelve full-time attorneys, four paid interns, three paralegals and
seven secretaries, in addition to the use of the resources of the police and
sheriff's department, 5 7 while the county public defender had nine part-time
attorneys, one paralegal, one law clerk, one investigator and three
secretaries.158
148 Id. at 49-50.
149 Id. at 50.
150 Id. at 22
151 Id. at 37.
152 Id. at 26.
151 Id. at 30.
154 MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-501 (2003).
155 Id. § 7-4-2503,
156 NLADA ASSESSMENT, supra note 41, at 19 (citing Deposition of John Connor (Aug.
21, 2002)).




A plethora of anecdotal horror stories stemmed from this crisis. For
instance, attorneys contracted by counties to provide indigent defense work
made eighteen dollars an hour.159 The chief contract public defender in
Flathead County, Montana, did not present a single case to a jury between
1994 and 1999 and filed no motions to suppress evidence or have cases
dismissed. 160  A Montana public defender testified that in Silver Bow
County, the prosecutor's office had a budget four times larger than that
alloted to the public defender. 16' There were also many stories about those
directly impacted by Montana's dismal indigent defense system. For
example, a woman accused of possessing methamphetamine sat in jail for
ten months before she could enter a guilty plea. 16' During this time her
house was repossessed and sold at auction. 163 These stories exemplified the
need for Montana to fix its system of indigent defense.
B. CHANGE IN MONTANA
As recently as 2000, the Montana legislature had not even
contemplated transforming the state's locally-focused indigent defense
system. 164  An ACLU lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of
Montana's indigent system is often cited as the catalyst that precipitated
legislative consideration of this issue. 165 The ACLU filed this suit on behalf
of indigent criminal defendants from seven counties challenging the
adequacy of the public defender systems in their counties and the state. 166
159 Berlow, supra note 27.
160 Id,
161 AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
HEARINGS ON RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/gidhearlexcerptcaughlan.pdf. This testimony is from
Deirdre Caughlan, a public defender in Silver Bow County, Montana, who works under the
contract system. Id. In addition, she testified that her contract rate had not increased from
1995 to 2003, while the prosecutors' budget had increased by 33% in that same time period.
Id. 162 Dennison, supra note 9, at Al.
163 Id.; see also Maurice Possley, Montana Aims to Fix Public Defender System: State's
Effort Is 1st to Use Guidelines Suggested by ABA, CHI. TRIB,, June 21, 2005, at CII ("One
defendant waited 23 months to get to court on a charge that carried a maximum sentence of
13 months. Not a single indigent defendant in the misdemeanor courts had a defense lawyer.
A public defender was assigned a rape case where the defendant faced a life prison sentence
even though the lawyer had never handled such a case before. A former public defender said
conducting a defense investigation of the charges before trial was an 'aspirational'
activity.").
164 Telephone Interview with Scott Crichton, Executive Dir., ACLU of Mont., in
Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Crichton interview].
165 Id.
166 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 129. See infra Section IV.C for discussion
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The ACLU filed suit against the Governor of Montana, the Supreme Court
Administrator, the Appellate Defender Commissioners, the state district
court council members, and district court judges in Montana's First Judicial
District Court in Lewis and Clark County. 167 While this suit proceeded
through discovery and depositions,168 it was never adjudicated on the
merits.169 Instead, on May 7, 2004, the ACLU of Montana entered into a
stipulation with the Montana Attorney General's Office in which they
agreed to postpone the lawsuit in order to seek a legislative solution to
problems within Montana's public defender system. 170
Thus, in Montana change did not result from a judicially mandated
remedy, but rather through the legislature. 171 There are substantial benefits
to such legislative change: the new system is not restricted by the limits
inherent in judicial remedies; and since this change came from the political
will of the legislature, the legislature should have incentive to continue to
fund and enforce it. 172  Thus, those individuals concerned with the
continuing crisis in indigent defense will be better served by attempting to
bring change through the legislature rather than by focusing solely on
lawsuits. Through an examination of the factors that led to change in
Montana, academics, politicians, and practitioners concerned about indigent
defense can focus on how best to use often scarce resources.
1. How Did this Change Occur?
In analyzing the factors that led to this change, there are three
important questions: (1) why did the legislature decide to address this issue;
(2) what led the legislature to bring such transformative change; and (3)
what role should an attorney play in bringing this change.
First, one of the main reasons the legislature acted is that the
legislature and the Attorney General believed that they were going to lose
of the crisis in Montana's indigent defense system.
167 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 129, at 1.
168 Crichton interview, supra note 164.
169 The only controversy adjudicated before the court involved the defendants', Governor
Martz, Supreme Court Administrator Rick Lewis, and Appellate Defender Commissioners,
motion for a protective order to prevent the plaintiffs from taking the depositions of
Governor Martz and the Chief Justice of the Montana Supreme Court. White v. Martz, 2002
ML 3743 (lst Jud. Dist. Ct. Mont. 2002).
170 Scott Crichton, Guest Opinion: Legislation Must Guarantee Legal Defense for all
Montanans, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Mont.), Jan. 22, 2005, available at http://www.billings
gazette.net/articles/2005/01/22/opinion/export 190592.txt.
171 Dennison, supra note 9.
172 ROSENBERG, supra note 79, at 15-21; see also THE FEDERALIST, supra note 83, at 465.
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the suit against the ACLU. 173 Several factors caused the legislature and the
Attorney General to share this belief. First, the suit was brought with the
backing and resources of the local ACLU affiliate and the national ACLU,
and had the financial backing and resources of the national law firm
Cravath, Swaine, & Moore, LLP.174 The ACLU also involved the NLADA
in the lawsuit, commissioning the NLADA to conduct site visits and
interviews throughout Montana's indigent defense system. 175  Second, the
Attorney General may have realized the far-reaching ramifications of an
ACLU victory. 176 Thus, the legislature was motivated to keep matters of
public policy within its control. 177  This motive is especially likely
considering that the Montana legislature had experienced a recent legal loss
regarding school funding.178  After that legal defeat, the legislature had a
difficult time crafting education legislation that the Montana Supreme Court
agreed would amount to equitable funding.
179
Further, the state began to believe that it was in their financial interest
to have a state, as opposed to a local, system of indigent defense. For
example, State Representative John Parker said that the new system should
enable the state to control costs and, "[w]ith a state system, costs can be
managed, because the brunt of the work will be done by state employees on
173 Crichton interview, supra note 164; e-mail from Ron Waterman, lead counsel in
ACLU lawsuit, to author (Dec. 20, 2005, 11:56 CST) (on file with the author) [hereinafter
Waterman e-mail].
174 Crichton interview, supra note 164 (noting that not only were the financial backing
and legal resources of these two organizations behind the lawsuit, but they were able to
deploy people to rural courthouses to evaluate the indigent defense systems).
175 NLADA ASSESSMENT, supra note 41, at 1.
176 See LAW & JUSTICE INTERIM COMM., FOR THE DEFENSE: ENACTING A STATEWIDE
PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM IN MONTANA, 59th Leg., at 37 (2004) ("All individuals who had
already been convicted of a felony and who were still within the system would potentially
have grounds for appeal contending that they had been convicted by a system which was
constitutionally deficient. Essentially this would adversely affect the sentences of
thousands of individuals who were in the prison system and still on probation and parole.
Further, once the system was found to be deficient, all prosecutions would have to come to
an end until a new system could be passed and put in place, with resulting delays and
possible speedy trial considerations. This would have caused a special session in the middle
of 2004 and there would have been considerable political fallout from such a
development.").
177 See id. ("[T]he legislature is the only body with the authority or power to set public
policy in this area [indigent public defense] and provide state funding.").
178 See Crichton interview, supra note 164; Waterman e-mail, supra note 173 ("We had
just gone through litigation over school funding, which has proven to now be difficult to
address legislatively because the Court is constantly overseeing all efforts to achieve
equitable funding and I believe that the AG and the Legislature did not want that to occur
with regard to the public defender system.").
179 Waterman e-mail, supra note 173.
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a salaried basis," since more than half the costs of the current system are for
private attorneys working on their own, with no supervision or coordinated
manner for controlling costs.1
80
Yet, the legislature went to great lengths to ensure that they were not
perceived to be acting only in response to the lawsuit. State Senator Dan
McGee, the future sponsor of the legislation, stated that the "unanimous
committee vote [to work on legislation]... [wa]s not part of a deal to settle
the lawsuit."' 81 In addition, statements on presentations used by the Law
and Justice Interim Committee (LJIC), a joint committee between the
Montana House and Senate, contained warnings such as, "CAUTION:
Remember systematic study process shouldn't be driven by the lawsuit."', 82
Thus, for a variety of reasons, in October 2003, the LJIC agreed to
make the public defender issue its top priority 83 and initiated a thorough
study of the issues and policy options. 84 On March 20, 2004, the LJIC
voted to draft a bill to create a statewide system of indigent defense.' 85 This
leads to the second question: why did the legislature draft such sweeping
legislation?
180 Dennison, supra note 9, at A].
181 Id.
182 Powerpoint Presentation, Law and Justice Interim Comm., Meeting (Oct. 23, 2003),
at slide 44. But see Mike Dennison, Panel Approves Statewide Public Defender System,
GREAT FALLS TRIB. (Mont.), Apr. 2, 2004, at A2-A3 (Senator McGee saying "[our vote]
accomplished what [the Attorney General] was looking for, which was some sort of
statement from the Legislature that this issue is going to be looked at and addressed").
183 In fact, during the 2003 session, a state senator introduced Senate Bill 218, which
would have created a statewide system of indigent defense. Dennison, supra note 182, at
A3. The bill died, however, when lawmakers could not agree how or whether to fund it. Id.
In addition, Scott Crichton, Executive Director of the Montana ACLU, said that the
legislation proposed in 2003 would not have been sufficient for the ACLU to drop their
lawsuit. Crichton interview, supra note 164.
184 LAW & JUSTICE INTERIM COMM., supra note 176, at 18, 19. The LJIC studied the
public defender issue for more than ten months. Id. at 11. At each meeting staff presented
research reports, and stakeholders; experts, including the Chief Justice of the Montana
Supreme Court, the District Court Council, the Appellate Defender Commission, the Chief
Appellate Defender, the Montana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Attorney
General, the County Attorney Association, the Supreme Court Administrator, the Montana
Association of Counties, and the ACLU; national public defender research groups, including
the NLADA and the Spangenberg Group; and interested persons provided testimony and
exhibits. Id. The LJIC also examined a national Compendium of Standards for Indigent
Defense Systems, which pulled together model language and sample statutes related to public
defender system design, administration, and quality standards. Id. at 12.
181 Id. at 30.
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2. Why Was Legislation So Transformative?
One major reason that the legislature drafted such sweeping legislation
is that the ACLU did not settle its lawsuit with the Attorney General even
after the legislature began to work on the issue of public defense. The case
was still scheduled to go to trial in May 2004.186 Thus, the legislature knew
that it needed to draft legislation that would satisfy the ACLU to settle the
lawsuit.' 87 Moreover, the ACLU did not exclusively focus on litigation, but
used other means to keep pressing for a statewide indigent defense system
based on nationally-recognized standards. 188 The ACLU worked to form
coalitions and partnered with other organizations who were interested in the
same goals. 189 They also received a grant to hire a lobbyist to work for the
passage of a public defense bill.' 90
In addition, the ACLU and other groups strived to educate the
legislators and the public. For example, an organization of for-profit
criminal defense attorneys trained the members of LJIC on the differences
in the quality of representation they would receive if they could afford to
hire a for-profit criminal defense attorney, compared to the type of service
they would receive if they were indigent defendants.
91
The ACLU also attempted to influence public opinion in Montana and
nationally' 92 to persuade the legislature to pass the bill.' 93 The coalition in
Montana worked with NLADA to focus on what types of messages made
186 Dennison, supra note 9, at Al.
187 Crichton interview, supra note 164; Waterman e-mail, supra note 173.
188 This was particularly important because it was not clear if the LJIC was going to
"overhaul" the current system or just "tweak" it. Powerpoint Presentation, supra note 182,
at 51.
189 Crichton interview, supra note 164.
190 Id. As their lobbyist, they hired one of the best insurance lawyers in the state. Id.
She had a disparate array of contacts and was experienced in bill drafting. Id.
191 Id.
192 id.
193 Trying to harness public opinion to one's side seems to be a good strategy to attempt
to transform indigent public defense. Recent polling data has revealed that the public
strongly supports providing effective defense counsel to people accused of crimes who
cannot afford lawyers. See GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 5, at 3 (citing NLADA
ASSESSMENT, supra note 41); see also BELDEN, RUSSENELLO & STEWART, AMERICANS
CONSIDER INDIGENT DEFENSE: ANALYSIS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF PUBLIC OPINION 5 (2002).
Eighty-eight percent of respondents found the statement "[p]roviding competent legal
representation is one of our most fundamental rights in the US" convincing; sixty-five
percent found it very convincing. Id. Ninety-four percent of those polled believed that "[a]
lawyer with a small enough caseload to provide the time necessary to prepare a defense for
each person" is either an important or guaranteed right. Id. at 3. Ninety-one percent of
people polled found that "[r]esources to hire investigators to check evidence and find
witnesses" is either important or guaranteed. Id.
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the public understand the importance of indigent defense, 94 resulting in a
focus on the economic efficiency of statewide legislation. 195 The coalition
also tried to humanize the individuals actually impacted by the indigent
defense system by hiring a freelance writer, Michele Corriel, to write a
continuing series for the ACLU's website to provide greater insight into the
lives of those denied their rights by the Montana justice system.196 Corriel's
stories were then posted on the ACLU website and sent out to Montana
newspapers. 197
For many of the reasons discussed above, especially the backing of the
lawsuit by the national ACLU and Cravath, Swaine & Moore, LLP, the
Attorney General also agreed to help the ACLU lobby the legislature to
pass a bill comprehensive enough to convince the ACLU to drop their
suit.198 The Attorney General's office, for its part, agreed to advocate
alongside the ACLU during the 2005 legislative session for a statewide
system that would be overseen by a newly created public defender
commission, and that would establish standards to be followed by all public
defenders in the state. 199 The Attorney General's office also committed to
advocate for adequate funding.0° In fact, the Attorney General spoke to the
LJIC and said that movement toward creating a statewide system could help
resolve the suit.20' The Attorney General also stressed that if the Montana
legislature failed to pass a bill meeting the goals to the satisfaction of the
plaintiffs, the litigation would likely resume in May 2005.202
Additionally, there was local support on the ground for the legislature
to work on this issue. For example, the Montana Association of Counties
194 Crichton interview, supra note 164.
195 Press Release, ACLU, Statewide Public Defender Becoming a Reality (June 8, 2005),
available at http://www.aclu.org/crimjustice/indigent/10249prs20050608.html (citing lead
counsel in the ACLU lawsuit Ron Waterman as saying, "experienced attorneys, coupled with
economies of scale, will produce an efficient and cost-effective public defense system").
196 E-mail from Michele Corriel, freelance writer, to author (Nov. 20, 2005, 04:34 CST)
(on file with author).
197 As of November 19, 2005, there are six stories posted on the ACLU's website.
ACLU of Montana, available at http://www.aclumontana.org/Legislature/Issues.htm (last
visited Oct. 1, 2006).
198 Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Agrees to Postpone Trial Over Lack of Legal Defense
for Montana's Poor While Attorney General Seeks Legislative Remedy (May 7, 2004),
available at http://www.aclumontana.org/NewsEvents/PressReleases/05 07 04.htm ("[T]he
Attorney General has pledged to take a leadership role in advocating for meaningful
legislative reform designed to fix the deficiencies in the current system.").
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Dennison, supra note 182, at Al.
202 FOR THE DEFENSE, supra note 176, at 7.
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(MACo) urged the legislature to establish a statewide public defender
system.2 °3 State judges, prosecutors, and public defenders also attended
roundtable discussions with the LJIC to urge the development of a state
system of indigent public defense to represent indigent criminal
defendants.2 °4 The media stressed the wide support from the public and
every sector of Montana society in favor of creating a new statewide system
of indigent defense.2°5
Finally, approximately one month before the trial on the merits was to
occur, the state Attorney General approached the ACLU one last time with
the legislature's draft bill seeking a settlement.20 6 On May 5, 2005, the
Montana Legislature passed the Montana Public Defender Act.2°7
The ACLU and their partners did not stop working on the issue of
indigent defense because the litigation was on hold. Instead, these groups
used traditional organizing techniques of coalition building and educating
legislators and the public. The strengths of this approach-working to
create the requisite political will in the legislature to pass legislation
addressing the indigent defense problem-are shown in the transformative
bill that passed in Montana.
C. THE MONTANA PUBLIC DEFENDER ACT
The ACLU called the Montana Public Defender Act
41 ,208
"groundbreaking," but what is actually so groundbreaking about it?
While parts of the legislation are simple enough, °9 what is so striking is
that the legislation establishes a statewide public defense system 210 that will
203 Id.; MONT. ASS'N OF COUNTIES, MINUTES, 93RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE (Sept. 25,
2005), available at http://maco.cog.mt.us/pages/93rdANNUALCONFERENCEMINUTES
.htm (MACo passing a resolution for a state public defender system.).
204 Mike Dennison, Judicial Minds Push for Creating Statewide System of Public
Defenders, GREAT FALLS TRIB. (Mont.), Oct. 24, 2003, at A16.
205 Emily Metzgar, Justice Delayed in Court System, SHREVEPORT TIMES (La.), June 15,
2005, at A9 ("This bill received extremely wide support from state government to county
and city government, from judges and prosecutors to members of the defense commufity
and advocates for the mentally ill. Everyone worked together to make this happen.").
206 Robin Troy, Trial By Fire, MISSOULA INDEP. (Mont.), Dec. 23, 2004, at 17.
207 Montana Public Defender Act of 2005, § 3 (codified as amended at MONT. CODE
ANN. §46-8-21 1-213 (2005)).
208 Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Hails Montana's Public Defense Bil as Leading
National Trend 1 (June 8, 2005), available at http://www.sado.org/fees/aclumontana.pdf.
209 For example, "[dluring the initial appearance before the court, every defendant must
be informed of the right to have counsel, and must be asked if the aid of counsel is desired."
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-101(1). The commentary to this statute says that this line is
loosely modeled after the 1987 code. Id.
210 Montana Public Defender Act of 2005 (codified as amended at MONT. CODE ANN. §
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ensure that counsel is qualified and competent, 2 1 and that adequate funding
is provided by the state. 12 Moreover, this legislation creates the first state
system of indigent defense that meets national standards for delivering
high-quality representation.213
The heart of the Act is the 'public defender commission: eleven
members appointed by the governor, who will supervise the entire indigent
defense system.21 4  The commission is responsible for establishing
qualifications, duties, and compensation for the chief public defender. 5
The commission will also be responsible for appointing the chief public
defender and regularly evaluating his or her performance.216 In addition,
this commission is charged with reviewing and approving the strategic plan
and budget proposal submitted by the chief public defender. 17
Furthermore, the commission is charged with promulgating statewide
standards for the qualification and training of all indigent defense attorneys.
This will ensure that all indigent defense services are provided by
competent counsel and are "fair and consistent throughout the state. 21 8
These standards will establish, among other things, the level of education
and experience needed for an attorney to try certain types of cases,
acceptable caseload and workload levels, practice standards, and
performance evaluation protocols.219 The commission is also responsible
47-1-102(1)).
211 MONT. CODEANN. § 47-1-102(3).
212 Id. § 47-1-102(5).
213 Post, supra note 9; see also Dennison, supra note 9, at Al (quoting Vince Warren,
senior staff attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union as saying, "I think Montana has
really put itself as a national leader by passing this legislation. This is the first legislation of
its kind that actually was crafted with the intent of addressing national standards for indigent
defense.").
214 MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-1028. The commission will be comprised as follows: two
attorneys from nominees submitted by the supreme court; three attorneys from nominees
submitted by the president of the state bar, one who has served a minimum of one year as a
full-time public defender, one experienced in the defense of juvenil delinquency, and one
who represents criminal defense lawyers; two members of the general public; one person
who is a member of an organization that advocates on behalf of indigent people; one person
who advocates on behalf of racial minority populations; one person who advocates on behalf
of people with mental illnesses and developmental disabilities; and one person who works
for an organization that provides addictive behavior counseling. Id.
215 Id. § 47-1-105(1).
216 Id.
217 Id. § 105(3).




for submitting a biennial report on the status of the indigent public defense
system to the governor, supreme court, and the legislature. 2 °
The legislation also established an office of the state public defender,
which includes an administrative director, a chief public defender, a chief
appellate defender, a training coordinator, deputy public defenders, assistant
public defenders, and other necessary support staff.22 1 The chief public
defender's duties include preparing a regional strategic plan, supervising
deputy directors, ensuring that detailed expenditure and caseload data is
kept, managing caseloads, supervising a training program, and establishing
performance and evaluation criteria.222
The Public Defender Act, passed in 2005, is still in its implementation
stage, and the true success of the program will have to be evaluated in
subsequent years. However, it appears that the Montana Legislature has
succeeded in transforming the state's indigent defense system. First, the
Act abides by the ABA's principles of independence, training, supervision,
standards, and parity.223 Moreover, Montana has already begun putting its
new legislation into practice. On April 21, 2006, the State Public Defender
Commission approved a strategic plan for implementing the Montana
Public Defender Act.224 This strategic plan defines how the state public
defender system will provide services to clients, provides a cost estimate for
the proposed system, and proposes an organization structure to operate and
manage the system. 225 Additionally, by August 2006, the office of the state
public defender had already promulgated a one hundred page document of
public defender standards.226 This document sets the standards for counsel
representing indigent defendants pursuant to the Montana Public Defender
220 Id. § 105(9). The report will detail "all policies or procedures in effect for the
operation and administration of the statewide public defender system" including: all
standards established; "the number of deputy public defenders and the region supervised by
each"; "the numbers of public defenders employed or contracted with in [sic] the
system... "; the number of staff supervised by each deputy public defenders; "the number
of new cases in which counsel was assigned to represent a party"; the total number of people
represented; "the annual caseload and workload of each public defender"; the training
programs conducted; "the continuing education courses on criminal defense or criminal
procedure"; and "detailed expenditure data by court and case type." Id.
221 Id. § 47-1-201.
222 Id. § 201-02.
223 See supra note 73.
224 OFFICE OF THE STATE PUB. DEFENDER, STRATEGIC PLAN (2006), available at
http://publicdefender.mt.gov/docs/strategic-plan_2006-new.pdf
225 Id.
226 STANDARDS FOR COUNSEL REPRESENTING INDIVIDUALS PURSUANT TO THE MONTANA




Act; standards for appellate advocacy and post-conviction proceedings;
standards for representation of youth; as well as a plethora of other
standards. 7 Statewide public defense trainings have also begun. On July
12-14, 2006, Montana held its first annual Montana Public Defender
Training Conference. 2
V. CONCLUSION
Activists advocating on behalf of indigent defendants often have very
limited resources with which to work. Thus, to fix indigent defense
systems, strategic choices must be made about which type of advocacy will
most efficiently allow indigent defense activists to reach their goals of a
better system. In examining changes brought to indigent defense systems
from court cases spurring judicially sanctioned remedies, as demonstrated,
in Peart, Smith, and Lynch, or passed by the legislature without a judicial
mandate, as recently occurred in Montana, the legislative option is much
more transformative. Furthermore, since the legislation was passed through
political will, funding and enforcement should not be as much of a concern.
However, as seen in Montana, a lawsuit, especially one with the backing of
national organizations and well-financed law firms, can be the one catalyst
that sets the whole process of change in motion. Accordingly, it is
important that lawyers not only continue to bring lawsuits, but also that they
work to forge a coalition of groups on all sides of the political and legal
spectrum, to demonstrate to the legislature that it is in their best interest to
pass legislation that provides indigent defense programs adequate funding,
statewide administration, and parity of resources.
227 Id.
228 MONT. PUBLIC DEFENDERS, THE MONTANA PUBLIC DEFENDERS ORIENTATION
CONFERENCE (2006), available at http://publicdefender.mt.gov/docs/newtraining
orientationbrochure.pdf. Randi Hood, the Chief Public Defender, stated:
This orientation conference is intended to assist all of us in developing a clear understanding of
the goals and objectives of the Montana Public Defender Act and to demonstrate to each of you
that the central office staff and I are fully committed to providing you with every resource you
need to achieve the highest possible level of confidence and proficiency as you undertake to
represent Montana's indigent clientele.
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